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ABSTRACT 
Should organization studies aspire to be a mono-paradigmatic science as argued by Pfeffer or should we pursue 
a strategy of unconditional pluralism by “letting thousands flower grow”? A new framework is presented that 
suggests that scientific progress in organization studies will best be promoted by upholding a balance between 
the exploitation of existing research programs and the exploration of new research programs. Too much 
pluralism can be as destructive for scientific progress as too little pluralism. 
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During the 1980s and 1990s organization scholars have increasingly been debating whether 
the coexistence of several research programs was a blessing or a curse for the advancement 
of their field. Two opposing positions have gradually emerged that support either a 
unification or a pluralist prescription. Those who support the unification position argue with 
reference to Thomas Kuhn (1970) and Michael Polanyi (1958) that upholding a scientific 
consensus is a necessary condition for the accumulation of knowledge. If researchers in a 
field like organization theory “were too willing to accept every unorthodox theory, method, 
or technique, the established consensus would be destroyed, and the intellectual structure of 
science would become chaotic. Scientists would be faced with a multitude of conflicting and 
unorganized theories and would lack research guidelines and standards” (S. Cole, 1983:135). 
The main advocate of this position in organization theory, Jeffrey Pfeffer (1993), argues that 
scientific fields that are more paradigmatically developed will tend to advance more rapidly, 
fare better in the contest for resources, have larger and better organized “invisible colleges”, 
have lower journal rejection rates, have fewer coordination problems and therefore will be 
more likely to take advantage of the benefits of team work than paradigmatically less 
developed fields.  On the other hand those that support a pluralist position argue that the 
more research programs are advanced the better for the long-term growth of the field.  
Several reasons have been given to support this position. One reason is that in order to 
understand the highly complex reality different theories are required since most theories only 
highlights one aspect of this world.  Another reason is that the existences of many theories 
promote competition and increase the chances for scientific advances. One proponent of this 
pluralist position in organization theory, John Van Maanen (1995a & b), therefore argues that 
one of the most important issues related to theory development in organization theory is to 
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answer the following questions. What institutional arrangements are more likely to facilitate 
tolerance, learning and conversations? What are the conditions that surround productive 
scholarly exchanges in the field? However, Van Maanen do not raise the question whether 
the strategy of “letting thousands flowers bloom” actually is a good or bad strategy for 
organization theory. 
 
The main purpose of this paper is to define what intellectual structure best promotes the 
advancement of the field of organization studies. A conceptual framework is proposed to 
analyze different intellectual structures and appraise how they perform in promoting 
scientific progress. The term “intellectual structure” refers to the distribution of activities 
within a scientific field at a specific point in time. This paper will especially focus on the 
distribution between activities aimed at refining existing research programs on one hand and 
activities aimed at searching for new theories on the other hand. In accordance with studies 
of adaptive processes, it is argued that in order to make progress over a long period of time a 
scientific field has to secure a balance between the generation of new theoretical alternatives 
and the selection and retention of them. As a consequence we may find intellectual fields 
with a too low as well as a too high degree of theoretical pluralism that each are confronted 
with a specific set of problems. In fact, it is argued that both the unification strategy and the 
pluralist strategy may lead to intellectual structures that have sub-optimal traits by either 
having too little or too much pluralism.  Fields with too little pluralism run the risk of being 
caught in a specialization trap, while fields with too much pluralism run the risk of being 
caught in a fragmentation trap. Both of these traps emerge as a result of self-reinforcing 
processes where either the activity of extending an existing research program (normal 
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science) or the activity of searching for new research programs (extraordinary science) get 
reinforced and sooner or later become dominant in the field.  
 
The specialization trap - where the elaboration of a dominant research program completely 
comes to drive out the search for new and heterodox theories – emerges because the 
exploitation of an existing research program gives a much faster and safer return than the 
experimentation with a completely new and uncertain research program. As researchers 
develop better and better skills at using the problem solving heuristic of a research program 
they will be inclined to use this program even more in the future, thus further increasing the 
strength of its heuristic and the opportunity costs of switching to another research program. 
The consequence of this trap is a scarcity of exploratory activities that undermines the long 
run adaptability of the field to new and unpredictable future situations.  This is the main risk 
of following the unification strategy in organization theory proposed by Pfeffer (1993) and 
later supported by Donaldson (1995, 1996a).   
 
The second trap is called a fragmentation trap. Its main characteristic is that the search for 
new theories comes to dominate the activity of extending and elaborating a research program. 
The fragmentation trap will emerge when too many new theories are proposed at a too fast 
pace in order for the scientific community to be able to evaluate each contribution properly 
and to integrate them into a reasonable coherent knowledge structure.  Three implications 
follow from this. First, single theories are typically not turned into coherent research 
programs with their own unified way of solving problems, because there is too little 
persistence in the community of researchers to “stick to” one theory in order to investigate its 
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potential for solving other problems as well. Second, there is not enough time to determine 
the relationship between the different theories i.e. whether they compete or complement each 
other. Third, since the relationships between old and new theories are never determined there 
will be no cumulative growth in the field. New theories will either just succeed – rather than 
replace - old theories until one or both of them are forgotten. As a consequence the 
knowledge structure of the field will become more and more fragmented, since new theories 
are just tacked unto the existing structure in an ad hoc manner rather than being integrated 
with the fond of existing contributions. And with a more fragmented discipline it becomes 
more and more difficult to use the existing knowledge structure to construct new 
contributions, which will undermine the chances for scientific progress in the future. This is 
the risk of following the pluralist strategy proposed by authors like Van Maanen (1995) and 
Daft and Lewin (1990) in organization studies itself.  
 
Contrary to both the unification and the pluralist position this paper argues for a position of 
“limited pluralism” which proposes that upholding a balance between extending existing 
research programs and searching for new theories is a prerequisite for scientific progress in 
the field of organization studies.  In fact, this “third” position should not be seen as surprising 
since it is just an application of organizational learning theory (March, 1991; Levinthal & 
March, 1993) to the field of organization studies itself.  
 
But before proceeding any further with the analysis let me shortly describe the perspective 
from which the field of organization studies is viewed and the methodological position 
adopted in this paper. The main argument is that the relationship between pluralism and 
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scientific progress is a contingent rather than an absolute one in the sense that this 
relationship depends on the ‘social structure’ of the research community of the field. 
Consequently, a major part of the paper will look at the field of organization studies from a 
“sociology of science” perspective, with an attempt to establish what ‘social structures’ have 
characterized the field at different times. Being a ‘non-cognitive’ type of sociology of science 
though, it is closer to the classic sociology of science represented by R. Merton than to the 
more recent sociology of science of B. Latour (1982). And by studying which effects a 
higher degree of theoretical pluralism may have on scientific progress, given a specific type 
of social structure in the field, I assume a non-relativist methodological framework in which 
it is possible to compare different research programs. Contrary to some post-kuhnian and 
post-modern views, it is argued that there can be rational debates, communication and 
choices between the different theories and paradigms in organization studies.        
 
A review of the debate on the relationship between pluralism and scientific progress in 
organization studies. 
 
According to several reviewers (e.g. Anna Grandori, 1987; Michael Reed, 1992) from the 
late 1950s to the late 1970s organization studies has been characterized by a relatively high 
degree of consensus with regard to both theoretical and empirical issues mainly due to the 
hegemony of the structural contingency program. The emergence and later coexistence of 
several competing research programs in the mid 1970s such as population ecology, neo-
institutionalism, resource-dependency theory and organization economics made it 
significantly more difficult in organization studies to agree on how to prioritize problems and 
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choose between methods to use in order to solve these problems. As a result, the uncertainty 
facing the individual organizational researcher in performing his or her research activities has 
increased significantly. The increase of theoretical pluralism has also produced a field in 
which the allocation of reputation became more ambiguous and the structure of knowledge 
became more complex than before. 
 
As one may suspect the high degree of theoretical diversity in organization studies has been 
appraised very differently. In the period just following the break down of the hegemony of 
the Structural Contingency Program, many organizational researchers expressed positive 
feelings regarding the new state of affairs in the field. Not only were organization researchers 
more receptive and more willing to take on new theoretical and empirical problems, but they 
were also open to a range of non-positivist methodological frameworks. Burrell & Morgan 
(1978) were among the first to map the field according to which meta-theoretical positions 
could potentially be developed within the field. Like many other organization researchers, 
Burell & Morgan, regarded this development of the field from a mono-paradigmatic to a 
multi-paradigmatic state as being very positive.  However, looking upon the field from a 
kuhnian perspective, they came to the conclusion that the major paradigms in the field were 
mutually exclusive and incommensurable, since there were no paradigm independent criteria 
to appraise which of a set of competing paradigms should be preferred. Burell & Morgan 
even suggested that the incommensurability thesis could be used by new heterodox 
paradigms as a way of defending themselves against the mainstream functionalist paradigm 
through arguing for paradigm closure and isolationism.  
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More subtle statements later replaced the early statements regarding the virtues of theoretical 
diversity and paradigm closure in organization science. Willmot (1990), Hassard (1993), and 
Reed (1985) found that Burell & Morgan's acceptance of the incommensurability thesis and 
the idea that there can be no communication between paradigms in organization theory was 
unwarranted. Furthermore, Scott (1998) argued that there exist very different relationships 
between research programs or "perspectives" in organization theory. In some cases, the 
perspectives are "partially in conflict"; in other cases they  "partially overlap" and in still 
other cases they "partially complement one another” (p.31). Although the different 
perspectives have emerged at different times, according to Scott, the later perspectives have 
not been able to completely supplant the earlier ones. Instead, they "continue to coexist and 
to claim their share of advocates” (p.31).  This trend of an increasing number of theoretical 
perspectives in the field may, according to Scott, pose some severe problems. For instance, as 
more and more new perspectives are introduced into the field, the background knowledge 
becomes more complex and it is increasingly difficult to uphold a consensus in the field. 
However, as Scott argues, "the existence of multiple paradigms may reduce consensus and 
support, it does not thereby necessarily reduce the power of the ideas and the value of 
possessing multiple lens through which to observe our world" (118-9).              
 
Recently, a more critical attitude towards theoretical pluralism has emerged. In his early 
attempt of mapping organization studies by setting up a typology of different research 
programs, Jeffrey Pfeffer (1982) noticed that due to the proliferation of middle range 
theories, the field had become a ”weed patch” rather than a ”well-tended garden”. This 
tendency towards fragmentation of organization studies due to the proliferation of new 
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research programs could, according to Zammuto and Connolly (1984), be counteracted by 
teaching new students about the social structure of the field and about strategies for coping 
with the information overload resulting from the fragmentation. Mone and McKinley (1993) 
explained the fragmentation of the field as a result of the diffusion of a ”uniqueness value”, 
i.e. a value that emphasized the drive to be novel, original, innovative, etc. rather than a value 
to conform to and to extend the existing research programs. Furthermore, they argued for the 
existence of several mechanisms that will further reinforce or promote adherence to the 
”uniqueness” value, indicating that the tendency towards fragmentation will, indeed, be very 
difficult to reverse.  Donaldson (1995) took this argument one step further by proposing that 
the proliferation of paradigms reflects a pathological status contest among individuals who 
gain a higher reputation by creating new research programs than by expanding and testing 
existing research programs. Donaldson complained that several of the new research programs 
reflect an anti-managerial bias among American organization theorists.  
  
The most coherent statement regarding the fragmentation of organization studies so far was 
published by J. Pfeffer in 1993 with the title: "Barriers to the Advance of Organization 
Science: Paradigm Development as a Dependent Variable".  Pfeffer argued that the increased 
theoretical diversity had several negative implications, including a break-down of the 
consensus among scholars that were unable to agree on core issues such as what research 
should be funded, what articles should be published, etc. This lack of a consensus 
furthermore weakened the support for the field from the universities and from the state. And 
if this weakening of the consensus and fragmentation of the field continued, organization 
studies would, according to Pfeffer, ”remain ripe for either a hostile takeover from within or 
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from outside” (1993:618). Indeed, the field would come to look more and more like political 
science, which had been taken over by the "rational choice" paradigm imported from 
economics.  
 
It was against this background that Pfeffer argued that organization studies needed to be 
much more consciously organized and managed, if it wanted to avoid the risk of being taken 
over by the economists. The community of organizational researchers was therefore urged to 
invest authority in a small well-published elite that through their control of journals, 
positions, resources, etc. should be able to enforce a consensus, thereby increasing the 
reputation, power and financial support of the profession. However, Pfeffer did not explain in 
any details how this could be accomplished and towards which paradigm the field should 
converge. Though Pfeffer was impressed by the way economics as a field had been able to 
obtain consensus and get plenty of external funding and support, he was very critical towards 
having the rational choice paradigm as the mainstream tradition in organizational research, 
considering its lack of empirical success. 
 
It was this case for a strategy of unification that Canella & Praetzodd (1994) and Van 
Maanen (1995a & b) all set out to debunk. Since knowledge is socially constructed, 
according to Canella & Praetzodd, organization researchers will be unable to make 
unambiguous claims on some absolute truth. Trying to enforce a consensus upon the 
community of organization researchers as argued by Pfeffer will be counterproductive since 
it leads to a stagnation rather than scientific progress in the field. While both Canella & 
Praetzod had followed Pfeffer in taking a formal organizational approach to the advance of 
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the field, Van Maanen focussed much more on the rhetoric aspect of organizational research 
and how the development of good ideas can be facilitated. He argued that Pfeffer’s view of 
organization studies were “insufferable smug; pious and orthodox; philosophically 
indefensible; extraordinary naïve as to how science actually works; theoretically foolish, vain 
and autocratic” (1995: 133).  In opposition to Pfeffer, but like Canella & Praetzod, Van 
Maanen was confident that theoretical pluralism would facilitate the growth of knowledge in 
the field. Consequently, he was interested in how to increase tolerance between different 
approaches in order to improve scholarly exchanges and understanding within the field.    
 
It is against the background of these very different descriptions and appraisals of how 
organization study as a field function that this paper will explore the relationship between 
theoretical pluralism, scientific progress and the social structure of the scientific community 
within organization study. Ever since the “fall” of the contingency program in the mid to late 
1970s and the proliferation of new research programs in the late 1970s and the 1980s, the 
relationship between pluralism and scientific progress has been a central concern within the 
community of organization researchers. In accordance with the “conventional wisdom” of 
philosophy of science, many organization researchers have taken the position that the 
increase of theoretical pluralism in organization studies since the mid-1970s was positive, 
because it facilitated faster growth of knowledge in the field. Lately, however, an increasing 
number of researchers have raised warnings, questioning the “conventional wisdom” that 
more pluralism should lead to faster growth of knowledge. These researchers argue that 
organization studies may (have) become too fragmented thereby inhibiting, rather than 
speeding up, scientific progress.  
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On research programs, scientific progress and theoretical pluralism: Some definitions. 
 
Osigweh (1989) has suggested that there is a need for greater precision in concept definition. 
This seems especially true when rather broad concepts such as research program, scientific 
progress and theoretical pluralism are debated. Take, for instance, the thesis under debate in 
this paper that an increase of theoretical pluralism will lead to faster scientific progress. For 
many researchers, an increase of pluralism is often simply taken as evidence of scientific 
progress. Consequently, by not carefully distinguishing between the two concepts, Popper's 
thesis is hereby turned into a tautology. We may avoid this by carefully defining each 
concept independently. Let us start with the concept of "research program".  
 
Using Imre Lakatos' (1970) Methodology of Scientific Research Programs (MSRP), a 
research program (such as contingency theory, population ecology, new institutionalism, 
transaction cost economics, etc.)  may be defined as a series of theories T1, T2, ….Tn, that 
all have a "family resemblance".  According to Lakatos, there are two reasons for such a 
family resemblance to exist. First, each of the theories within a research program builds on 
the same "hard core" propositions (H) that is regarded as non-falsifiable. By gradually 
exchanging the auxiliary hypotheses in the protective belt of the program (B1 is replaced 
with B2 and B2 is later replaced with B3, etc.), a series of theories T1, T2, T3,…..Tn, is 
constructed in the following way: T1 = H & B1, T2 = H & B2, etc. In the case of the 
contingency research program, the hard core is the 'fitness', 'efficiency' or the 'alignment' 
thesis, while the protective belt consists of the hypotheses describing different types of 
 12
 13
organizational structures and different types of contingency variables. Second, when 
researchers construct new theories within a research program by changing some of the 
auxiliary hypotheses in the protective belt, they rely on the positive and negative heuristic. 
That is, they rely on a set of rules defining how problems should or should not be solved for 
them to be accepted within the program. In the contingency tradition, for instance, the 
heuristic consists of positive and negative advises on how to develop the protective belt, 
thereby formulating testable versions of the program. 
 
So far, we have defined what a research program (such as the contingency research program) 
is and we have described its internal theoretical development or what Kuhn (1970) calls the 
normal science of such a research program (cf. Lex Donaldson, 1996a). However, not all 
theoretical developments have this piecemeal character, where researchers try to solve new 
problems by taking the 'hard core' and the 'positive' and 'negative heuristic' as given and only 
make marginal changes in the protective belt. In some cases, researchers do also question the 
most basic assumptions of their research program and the 'standard' way of solving problems, 
i.e. they question the hard core and the positive and negative heuristic. This happened in 
organizational studies during the late 1970s and early 1980s when the contingency research 
program was partly replaced by newer research programs such as population ecology, 
organizational economics, new institutionalism and resource dependency theory. In this case, 
both the fitness assumption (the hard core) and the method of solving problems in the 
contingency program in terms of the variance approach (the positive and negative heuristic) 
came under attack and were replaced by new hard core propositions and new heuristic rules. 
While Lakatos describes this kind of development as a 'shift' between research programs, 
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Kuhn talks about either a 'shift' of paradigm or a 'scientific revolution' in order to emphasize 
the dramatic character of such a change. 
 
The second concept that is used extensively in this paper and which is in need of a careful 
definition is the concept of 'scientific progress'. A clarification of this concept can fruitfully 
take its point of departure in the distinction between the two types of research development 
defined above. On one hand the relatively conservative shift between two theories T1 and T2 
within the same research program and on the other hand a much more revolutionary shift 
between two research programs RP1 and RP2.   
  
In this paper ‘scientific progress’ will be defined as the establishment of a ‘correspondence 
relationship’ between two theories or two research programs. Popper has given the following 
intuitive understanding of this concept: ”I suggest that whenever in the empirical sciences a 
new theory of a higher level of universality successfully explains some older theory by 
correcting it, then this is a sure sign that the new theory has penetrated deeper than the older 
ones. The demand that a new theory should contain the old one approximately, for 
appropriate values of the parameters of the new theory, may be called (following Bohr) the 
'principle of correspondence'" (1972:202). A 'correspondence' view of scientific progress can 
also be interpreted as a dialectical view of scientific development. Scientific problems 
emerge from tensions, contradictions or anomalies either within a single theory or between 
two or more theories. According to the correspondence view of scientific progress, tensions,  
contradictions or paradoxes emerge because we are trying to use a theory T1 to solve 
problems that are in fact lying outside T1's domain of application D1. In order to remove the 
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contradiction or tension in a theory T1, we may try to construct a new and more “general” 
theory T2 that has a wider domain of application D2. A scientific progress will consist in a 
new theory T2 that “corrects” an older theory T1 by first clarifying its limited domain of 
application D1 and second by making new predictions (or explanations) outside this domain 
of application (D2 – D1). We can express this by saying that T2 ? T1 in D1, while T2 ? ~ 
T1 in D2 – D1. That is, by constructing a new theory T2, we learn more about the limited 
domain of T1 because we are able to explain why the old theory was falsified or couldn’t 
solve a problem outside its domain D1. In summary, we say that we have established a 
correspondence relationship between T1 and T2 when: 
 
              D1⊂ D2,  V1 ⊂ V2,     T2  => T1 in D1     &       T2 => ¬ T1   in D2 - D1 
 
In the definition of what a research program is, we have distinguished between two types of 
theoretical developments: a shift between two theories within the same research program 
(normal science) and a shift between two research programs (a 'scientific revolution'). Our 
definition of the concept of  'scientific progress' in terms of a relationship of  (homogenous) 
correspondence is mainly linked to the first of these types of theoretical development, i.e. a 
shift between two theories within the same research program. This is due to the fact that we 
have been talking about relationships of homogenous correspondence where the two theories 
are basically using the same vocabularies. However, we can extend the relationship of 
correspondence to also include heterogeneous relationships, i.e. relationships between two 
theories or research programs that are using different vocabularies V1 and V2 like for 
instance, when researchers belong to 2 different research programs and build on different 
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hard core hypotheses, using different heuristics to solve the same problems. A relationship of 
heterogeneous correspondence between two research programs RP1 and RP2 may be defined 
in the following way: D1 ⊂ D2, V1 ⇒ V2, RP2 => T1 in D1 and RP2 => ¬ RP1 in D2 - D1. 
In this case we need to be able to "translate" the vocabulary V1 of the first research program 
to the vocabulary V2 of the second research program (otherwise this definition is the same as 
a relationship of homogeneous correspondence). 
 
The third concept that has a central role in this paper is the concept of pluralism.  Like so 
many other popular concepts in organization science, its meaning is often not very clear. To 
start with, we may note that the notion of pluralism can refer to many different things such as 
ontological pluralism, methodological pluralism, theoretical pluralism, methodical pluralism, 
etc. or any combination of these (cf.U Maki,1997). This paper will mainly be concerned with 
theoretical pluralism.  
 
An argument for theoretical pluralism will have to include an explanation for why it is 
desirable to have a 'plurality' of research programs. One such justification is that a plurality 
of research programs will promote scientific progress within the field. Another justification 
for theoretical pluralism is the argument that since any research program only highlights one 
or a few aspects of reality, it will be necessary to have a 'plurality' of research programs if our 
goal is to get a reasonably adequate picture of the complex reality. Researchers that use this 
argument are often referring to the fable about ‘The Blind Man and the Elephant’ (cf. 
Mintzberg et al. 1998). This second argument for theoretical pluralism is often used in 
relation to applied research rather than theory development. Consequently, it may be argued 
that this literature does not contribute to answer the main question of this paper.   
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Since we will primarily be investigating the first of these two arguments for theoretical 
pluralism, let us shortly explore the modern history of this argument. One of the first 
philosopher of science to argue in favor of 'theoretical pluralism' was Karl Popper (1945) in 
his "The Open Society and Its Enemies".  Like later falsificationists such as Hans Albert, 
Imre Lakatos, John Watkins and the early contributions of Paul Feyerabend, Popper argued 
that the more 'open' a scientific field is towards new research programs, the tougher the 
competition and the better the chances for a scientific break-through. For the same reason, 
the scientific community should be very lenient towards new research programs, in order to 
make sure that they get enough time to mature, before being exposed to the fierce 
competition of older and maturer research programs.  In accordance with this position, Imre 
Lakatos argued that: "…we must not discard a budding research program simply because it 
has so far failed to overtake a powerful rival. As long as a budding research program can be 
rationally reconstructed as a progressive problem shift, it should be sheltered for a while 
from a powerful established rival" (1970:157). This argument very much resembles the 
"infant industry"-argument that recommends that new firms should be protected from outside 
competitors until they have grown strong enough to be exposed to the fierce competition of 
the world market from older and more mature foreign competitors. 
 
 The “valid domain” of the statement “that the more pluralistic a field becomes the more 
competition there will be, and the better will the chances be for a scientific break through”, 
has never been clearly determined. Popper (1945) who was the first philosopher of science to 
propose this thesis had primarily been interested in physics and other fields with a mono-
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paradigmatic structure. Due to the lack of variability characterizing the type of fields studied, 
these philosophers of science never came to question the validity of this thesis. For instance, 
in less mature and more applied types of scientific fields such as management studies, 
engineering, etc., the validity of this relationship seems highly questionable. However, before 
being able to say anything of the restricted domain of the relationship between theoretical 
pluralism and scientific progress, we need a framework that can inform us about variation 
between the different scientific fields. The point of departure of this paper is the comparative 
framework of Richard Whitley that studies how different scientific fields are organized as 
reputational systems. This framework will be used to describe the recent evolution of 
organization studies. 
 
The Structure of Organization Science as an Intellectual Field since 1960: Partitioned 
Bureaucracy, Polycentric Oligarchy or Fragmented Adhocracy? 
 
According to Richard Whitley (1984a & 1984b), it is possible to identify some of the most 
important and distinct features of scientific disciplines by analyzing them as reputational 
organizations. In this type of organizations, the members obtain their position in the 
hierarchy by making contributions to the knowledge structure of their field. The more a 
scientific community values the contributions of a researcher, the higher return in terms of 
reputation he or she will get. However, fields that are structured on the basis of their 
member's reputation may have very different structures. Whitley (1984) argues that it is 
possible to identify very different modes of how scientific fields are organized based on the 
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following two contingency variables: 1) degree of interdependency and 2) degree of task 
uncertainty.  
 
The degree of interdependency refers to how many researchers in a field are dependent on 
each other to obtain reputation. The more applied a field is, the more open it will be towards 
its environment (and its external audiences) and the less interdependency there will be. 
Conversely, the more basic a science is, the more will researchers have to rely on each other 
for obtaining their reputation. The degree of task uncertainty refers to the degree of 
uncertainty a researcher may face when trying to solve a specific problem. It is normally 
claimed that the main function of science is to produce new knowledge. What is accepted as 
new knowledge depends to a large extent on the background knowledge of the field. The 
more systematic, exact and general this knowledge is, the easier it is to determine whether a 
contribution is new or not and how well this contribution fit into the background knowledge 
of the field. If the background knowledge is well structured, which is the case of a mono 
paradigmatic field, the task uncertainty of an individual researcher will be low. Whitley 
(1984a) distinguishes between two different aspects of task uncertainties, technical and 
strategic. Technical task uncertainty refers to the degree of unpredictability and variability 
existing in a field with regard to the methods and procedures that is accepted to solve 
empirical problems. If there exist many different methods and if it is difficult to interpret the 
(test) results in a field, the degree of technical uncertainty is high. On the other hand, if a 
certain method has been canonized as being the only legitimate method, the degree of 
technical task uncertainty is low. Task uncertainty does not only have a technical aspect, but 
also involves a strategic (theoretical) aspect.  In this case, the researchers face a different 
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kind of uncertainty regarding which problems are important, less important, etc. and what 
goals should govern their research. In fields with a high degree of strategic task uncertainty, 
researchers are confronted with many different problems, the relevance and importance of 
which will be appraised very differently by different groups in the field. 
 
According to Whitley, variations in these two contingency variables make it possible to 
distinguish between at least seven different configurations of scientific field’s organizations. 
These structures include the following types with examples listed in brackets. 1) Fragmented 
adhocracy (management studies) 2) Polycentric oligarchy (continental philosophy and 
classical sociology) 3) Partitioned bureaucracy (Anglo-Saxon economics) 4) Professional 
adhocracy (Biomedicine, engineering) 5) Polycentric Profession (experimental physiology) 
6) Technological integrated bureaucracy (Chemistry) and 7) Conceptually integrated 
bureaucracy (Physics). 
 
Focussing primarily on organization studies, the discussion will be limited to the three 
configurations found in the social sciences. These are the Partitioned Bureaucracy, the 
Polycentric Oligarchy and the Fragmented Adhocracy.   An important thesis of this 
article is that organization studies, since the 1960s, has adopted all these three organizational 
configurations or at least configurations that are close to them, consecutively. By first giving 
a description of each of these configurations and second showing how organization studies at 
certain point in time or in different areas may fit into these, the stage will be set for the next 
and main section of this paper. In this section, it will be analyzed how the structure of 
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organization studies may influence the relationship between theoretical pluralism and 
scientific progress.  
--------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
---------------------------------- 
In general, social sciences such as sociology, management studies, anthropology, political 
science, etc. are less dominated by a single paradigm than the natural sciences are. This 
implies that we should expect to find less consensus and therefore more task uncertainty in 
the social sciences than in the natural sciences. The only social science that has diverged 
from this pattern is economics which, for a long period, has been dominated by a single 
paradigm and therefore has a substantially lower degree of strategic task uncertainty and a 
higher degree of interdependency than the other social sciences. According to Richard 
Whitley (1983, 1984a) the reputational configuration of economics may be characterized as a 
partitioned bureaucracy.       
 
 As a partitioned bureaucracy economics consists of a core with pure and abstract theorizing 
(within the optimization paradigm) and a number of peripheral sub fields of applied research 
(industrial organization, labour economics, international economics, etc.). Due to the absence 
of control over the object of research and the ambiguity of empirical testing in the social 
sciences, any unifying theoretical framework in a social science will be under a permanent 
threat to be replaced. In economics, however, this problem was solved by partitioning the 
core of pure theory with formal modeling from the applied and empirical research in the 
peripheral areas. Compared to other ways of organizing social science fields, economics has 
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a very hierarchical type of reputational organization, since research in the core of the field is 
viewed as much more prestigious than applied research in the peripheral sub fields. The term 
“partitioned” in partitioned bureaucracy refers to the absence of feedback from the applied 
research in the periphery to the pure theory in the core, i.e. the abstract models of the 
optimization paradigm have been "immunized” from potential "empirical falsifications" 
arising in the applied sub fields.  
 
Though economics is often portrayed (mostly by other social scientists) as having a 
completely unitary structure, the field includes several heterodox traditions (behavioralism, 
transaction cost economics, evolutionary theory, institutionalism, etc.) that during the past 20 
or 30 years have influenced mainstream economics in profound ways. Take the case of the 
transaction cost approach of Oliver Williamson that is of interest to organization researchers 
as well. In the 1970s, when Williamson turned Coase’s 1937-article into a research program, 
most mainstream economists for two reasons viewed the transaction cost approach as 
heterodox. First, Williamson didn’t follow the central maxim of not opening up the black box 
of the firm in orthodox theory. Instead he viewed the firm itself as an important economic 
institution that was in need of explanation. Second, Williamson based his research program 
on the hard core assumption that decision-makers are boundedly rational rather than perfect 
maximizers.  While neither the principle of not opening the black box of the firm nor the 
principle of bounded rationality were accepted by orthodox theory in the 1970s, both of the 
principles in transaction cost economics has been adopted by the modern orthodoxy of the 
1990s and 2000s.         
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How did the field of organization study evolve over time? During a relatively short period 
from the late 1950s to the mid-1970s, a single paradigm has managed to obtain a (near) 
dominant position within organization studies. By combining an open system view and a 
structural functionalist frame of explanation, contingency theorists created a paradigm for 
studying organizations that, for almost fifteen years, united and facilitated coordination 
within this very young field of study. In fact, the period from the late 50s to the middle of the 
70s is the only period during its short history where organization studies has had a 
hierarchical form of reputation organization. Or as stated by Lex Donaldson: “The normal 
science that has been pursued within the contingency paradigm is probably the largest single 
normal science research stream in the study of organizational structure to date” (1996b:58). 
However, there are some interesting differences to observe between the way economics and 
organization studies were organized as fields due to differences between their mainstream 
paradigms. While the optimization paradigm offered economic theorists a "coherent" way of 
doing highly abstract theoretical work, structural contingency theory was more a program for 
standardizing empirical research and testing empirical structure-contingency relationships 
than for solving theoretical problems. While the optimization paradigm therefore reduced the 
strategic task uncertainty of economics, structural contingency theory mainly reduced the 
technical task uncertainty of organization studies.  Unlike economics, organization studies 
never managed to separate the theoretical puzzle solving from empirical research by fully 
adopting a partitioned bureaucracy. This may be one of the reasons why economics has 
experienced a more stable intellectual structure than organization studies over time.  
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In the early 70s, the contingency research program came under increasing criticism both 
internally and externally. The internal criticism was mainly directed towards the 
inconsistencies and ambiguities in many empirical studies of contingency-structure 
relationships such as, for instance, the negative relationship between size and administrative 
intensity  (J. Kimberly, 1976 for a review). Indirectly these criticisms were directed towards 
the positive heuristics of the program that had almost exclusively relied upon a variance 
approach using cross-sectional data to formulate and test empirical regularities. The external 
criticism was directed towards the theoretical and philosophical underpinnings of the hard 
core assumptions of the contingency approach. It included a critique of its functionalist and 
deterministic framework that excluded the modeling of strategic choices, power 
relationships, processes of social change, etc. in organizations.       
 
In the later part of the 1970s, organization studies in the US experienced a proliferation of 
new theories such as transaction cost economics (Williamson,1975), population ecology 
(Hannan & Freeman, 1977), institutional theory (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) resource 
dependency theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), etc. As a consequence, the intellectual 
structure of “organization studies changed,” according to Michael Reed, "from orthodox 
consensus to pluralistic diversity" (1992:248). In the comparative framework of Whitley one 
may interpret this change as a transition from a bureaucratic type of organization during the 
hegemony of the structural contingency program to a polycentric oligarchy. 
 
A polycentric oligarchy is characterized by a high degree of interdependency combined 
with a high degree of technical and strategic task uncertainty.  This type of structure in a field 
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typically emerges when relatively small groups of researchers gain control over critical 
resources such as positions and journal access. But since the degree of task uncertainty is 
very high, their control can only be exercised locally and personally, resulting in the 
establishment of several independent centers. In organization studies these centers were 
formed around the main theories or research programs that emerged in the late 1970s such as 
population ecology, transaction cost economics, institutional theory, resource dependency 
theory, etc. Even though these new theories were all introduced during a period of only three 
years and organization studies became a fragmented field the innovation rate was 
subsequently dramatically reduced. During the 1980s no major innovative theories were 
introduced in the field. However, several of the theories introduced in the mid-70s such as 
population ecology, transaction cost economics and to some extent institutional theory were 
turned into ongoing research programs. Later during the 1990s several attempts were made to 
integrate some of the programs like for instance population ecology and institutional theory 
(Baum and Oliver, 1991, 1992). Within each of the research centers formed around these 
research programs, there was a relatively strong hierarchical reputational organization due to 
a consensus of what was the basic framework to be used, what were the important problems 
to be solved and how reputation should be allocated within the “specialized” research 
community. However, there was very little coordination and cooperation between the centers, 
but rather an intense competition in order to gain control over the field as a whole. The field 
therefore became balkanized into a set of more or less autonomous centers, each pursuing 
their own research agenda, with minimal interaction and communication. According to 
Whitley, examples of polycentric oligarchy include continental philosophy, continental 
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sociology and organization studies in the period after 1975 in the US could be added as a 
third example.   
 
James G. March’s description of how organization studies is structured is very much aligned 
to the polycentric oligarchy concept of Whitley: “As the field has grown and elaborated new 
perspectives, it has continually been threatened with becoming not so much a new integrated 
semidiscipline as a set of independent, self-congratulatory cultures of comprehension. This is 
evident with five or the more lively subfields [research programs] of contemporary studies of 
organizations…. Although these subfields [research programs] have been particularly 
successful in augmenting our understanding of organizations…..they have exhibited 
persistent symptoms of isolation, engaging in intermittent internecine worldview cleansing. 
In the name of technical purity and claims of universality, energized subfields [research 
programs] have tended to seal themselves off, each seemingly eager to close further the 
minds of the already converted, without opening the minds of others. There is, to be sure, a 
certain grim necessity in the process. Exploiting interesting ideas often thrives on 
commitment more than thoughtfulness, narrowness more than breath, cohesiveness more 
than openness”(1996:280, my additions in brackets). As the structure of polycentric 
oligarchy gradually developed, it both reinforced and was reinforced by the diffusion of the 
“uniquess value” (Mone & Mckinley, 1993). This implied that the separation of the field in 
different centers was reinforced, making work across the boundaries of the different centers 
(research programs) less likely. And the insulation of the different theoretical perspectives 
was reinforced by a rather uncritical acceptance of Kuhn’s thesis of incommensurability 
among the majority of organizational researchers (Andreas Georg Scherer, 1998). 
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The shift from a bureaucratic form of intellectual organization in organization studies to a 
polycentric oligarchy was partly due to the rapid growth of the field during the 1970s itself 
triggered by the expansion of education in management studies. The growth in positions and 
resources enabled new approaches to become entrenched in the reputational organizations 
thereby undermining the hegemony of the contingency research program. With the break up 
of contingency theory and the proliferation of new programs in the post 1975 period, the 
degree of strategic uncertainty and the degree of technical task uncertainty increased. For the 
individual organization researcher, prioritization of problems to solve and which empirical 
method to use was no longer as clear as it was during the hegemony of the structural 
contingency theory.  
 
While the development of organization studies in the US may be described as a shift from a 
bureaucratic structure to a structure of polycentric oligarchy, the situation in Europe was 
rather different. While US organization researchers had constructed a set of new theories or 
research programs as replacements for the contingency program, European organization 
researchers reacted mainly by rejecting/replacing the underlying positivistic methodology in 
the structural contingency program with other methodologies and philosophies. Important 
contributions were David Silverman (1971), Burell & Morgan (1979), Morgan (1986) and 
contributions within the postmodern movement (cf. Alvesson & Deetz, 1996). Much of 
European organization research tended to operate on a meta-theoretical level rather than on a 
theoretical level by discussing the ontology, epistemology and methodology of research 
rather than constructing new theories and research programs as their American collegues did 
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in the late 1970s. The close relationship with philosophy implied, however, that European 
organization researchers were confronted with even more strategic and technical task 
uncertainty than their American colleagues. Or as Clegg, Hardy and Nord state in their 
introduction to their “Handbook of Organization Studies”: “Gone is the certainty, if it ever 
existed, about what organizations are; gone, too is the certainty about how they should be 
studied, the place of the researcher, the role of methodology, the nature of theory. Defining 
organization studies today is by no means an easy task”(1996:3). That is, organization studies 
in Europe may best be described as being as a fragmented adhocracy.              
 
The fragmented adhocracy is characterized by a low degree of interdependency between 
researchers, which implies a rather “loose” or flat research organization. Since the 
researchers are facing very few restrictions in this type of organizational configuration 
regarding the choice of theoretical framework and the choice of research method, the degree 
of technical and strategic task uncertainty is very high. This implies a relatively fragmented 
knowledge structure and the existence of much disagreement about the relative importance of 
different problems to be solved by the field. As a result, the problem solving activity within 
the field takes place in a rather arbitrary and ad hoc manner, with limited attempts to 
integrate new solutions with the existing structure of knowledge. Management studies and 
contemporary American sociology are mentioned by Whitley (1984a) as examples of this 
type of reputational organizational form.  
 
Towards a Process Perspective on the Organization of Scientific Fields: Avoiding the 
"Specialization" and the "Fragmentation" trap. 
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Richard Whitley’s (1984a & b) comparative study of how different scientific fields are 
organized builds on a static type of analysis which is adequate for understanding structural 
questions like: How can we describe the structure of a field at a specific time? Why are 
certain structures observed in specific environments? His framework, however, is less 
adequate for answering process-oriented questions such as: How did a certain configuration 
in a scientific field emerge? What forces drive the transformation of a scientific field from 
one configuration to another configuration? What kinds of processes stabilize or destabilize a 
configuration?  
 
The strong structural bias of Whitley's framework also makes it less adequate to answer the 
main (process-oriented) questions of the present paper: To what extent does the configuration 
of a scientific field influence the relationship between theoretical pluralism and scientific 
progress? Is the relationship between increased theoretical pluralism and scientific progress, 
as implicitly argued by many philosophers of science, valid across all types of scientific 
fields independently of their social structure? Or is this relationship only valid for fields with 
some types of configurations (for instance a partitioned bureaucracy) but not for fields with 
other types of configurations (for instance a fragmented adhocracy) where more pluralism 
tend to lead to stagnation rather than scientific progress?  
 
To answer these questions, we need a framework that not only describes the structural 
characteristics of different scientific fields, but also identifies the underlying "processes" and 
"mechanisms" that operate within the different configurations as well as determine the major 
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dilemmas a field is confronted with. By supplementing the structuralist and comparative 
static framework of Whitley with a process-oriented account, it will be possible to explain 
how an increase in theoretical pluralism may lead to scientific progress within some 
configurations, but have the opposite effect within other types of configurations.  
 
A central thesis in this process-approach to the organization of scientific fields is that all 
disciplines are struggling in order to find a balance between exploitation, i.e. expanding an 
existing research program (normal science), and exploration, i.e. searching for new research 
programs (revolutionary science). Or stated in a slightly different way, that all scientific 
fields are confronted with finding an optimal trade-off between short run and long run 
activities or between continuity and change (cf. McKinley, Mone & Moon, 1999). Most 
scientific fields are in fact experiencing one of the following two imbalances. 
 
The first imbalance exists when there is too much emphasis on exploiting an already existing 
research program and too little emphasis on exploring new theories or research programs. In 
this case, the researchers in the field tend to value short-term more than long-term activities, 
thereby reducing the adaptability of the field to new situations. The second imbalance exists 
when there is too much emphasis on exploring new theories in order to establish new 
research programs and too little emphasis on the exploitation of already existing research 
programs.  In this case, the field is giving too much emphasis to the long-term activities of 
exploration compared to short-term activities of exploitation.     
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Finding a balance between exploitation and exploration has also been discussed by the 
philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn as finding an ”essential tension” between tradition and 
novelty. New and path-breaking research will, according to Thomas Kuhn (1977), always 
result from a tension between working within the framework of an existing paradigm while at 
the same time trying to transcend this paradigm in order to overcome its major weaknesses. 
Paradigms will always contain the “seeds” of their own destruction since scientific revolution 
would be unthinkable without long periods of normal science that identified the anomalies 
that triggered the shift from an old to a new paradigm.    
 
Besides having problems with securing a balance between exploiting existing research 
programs and searching for new research programs, scientific fields are exposed to traps that 
tend to drive a field into either a self-reinforcing spiral of elaborating existing programs or 
into a self-reinforcing spiral of search for new research programs. In both cases, the 
possibilities of keeping the optimal balance between extending existing research programs 
versus searching for new programs will be upset. 
 
The first trap may be called a ”specialization trap”. It will be present when normal science 
drives out revolutionary science and the activity of elaborating and extending an existing 
research program gradually comes to dominate the search for new research programs.  As 
researchers develop better and better skills in using an existing research program and its 
problem solving heuristic, the existing research program will be even more used by them to 
solve new problems, thus further increasing the strength of the research program's heuristic 
and the opportunity costs of searching for a new research program. This specialization trap 
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emerges because the exploitation of already existing research programs gives a faster and 
safer return than the experimentation with completely new and uncertain research programs. 
The implications of this trap in the long run is a scarcity of exploratory activities that 
undermines the flexibility of the field by reducing its ability to adapt to new and 
unpredictable situations. In organization theory a tendency towards such a “specialization 
trap” existed during the hegemony of the contingency research program with its strong 
adherence to a “variance approach” heuristic.  With the elaboration of this program, 
organization researchers developed more and more refined statistical-empirical methods that 
made it more and more attractive to refine this heuristic, but less and less attractive to switch 
to alternative heuristics such as a “process approach” (cf. Huber & Van de Ven, 1995). 
However, being locked into such a self-reinforcing process of specialization seem to have 
made the field of organization studies less prepared to switch to studies of organization 
change when such studies came in high demand due to a more turbulent and changing 
environment after 1975. It is therefore not surprising that several of the new research 
program emerging during the late 1970s had the ambition of viewing organizations from a 
longitudinal rather than a cross-sectional perspective and to develop a corresponding 
“process approach” heuristic.  Among the research programs emerging in the late 1970s, 
population ecology with its “inertia”-assumption seems to have been the most aware of this 
goal (cf. Freeman and Hannan, 1975).    
 
The second trap may be called a “fragmentation" trap. It will be present when revolutionary 
science drives out normal science and the search for new research programs comes to 
dominate the elaboration of existing research programs. There are several reasons for why a 
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scientific field may end up in a fragmentation trap. First, most new scientific ideas will be 
worse than the existing pool of ideas. Second, it takes a lot of time and experience before the 
positive heuristic of a new research program can be developed enough so that it can be 
successfully exploited by normal scientists. Even the most successful research programs will 
therefore perform rather badly to start with. Because of a lack of persistency in the scientific 
community many research programs may therefore never be investigated well enough, before 
new research programs have been proposed and have replaced them. The "true" potential of 
such new research programs will therefore never be discovered. In fact, no mechanisms seem 
to be in place to secure that progressive programs survive degenerating programs. And when 
the process that drives revolutionary science to replace normal science takes on a self-
reinforcing character, the field ends up in the "fragmentation" trap" where one theory or 
research program is just replaced by the next theory or research program with minimal 
accumulation of knowledge.  
 
When no less than four new research programs were introduced into organization studies in 
the late 1970s to replace the structural contingency program in less than 3 years, W.R.Scott 
(1993) issued a warning that may be interpreted as if organization studies was in danger of 
falling into a fragmentation trap: “These diverse and conflicting paradigms came tumbling 
into the placid arena of organizational studies in rapid succession – too rapidly to be properly 
evaluated or reconciled” (1993:63). Not being able to sort out whether the different research 
programs were progressive or not and what theoretical relationships existed between them 
threatened to lead to a fragmentation trap that in the long run would make scientific progress 
in the field less likely. Observe, however, that it is not the absolute number of research 
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programs but the rate at which new programs are introduced that determines whether a field 
ends up in a fragmentation trap or not.  Since the 1980s may be described as a period of 
consolidation for US organization studies in the sense that no new programs were introduced 
and the field escaped falling into a fragmentation trap. Instead, during the 1980s the existing 
programs were all trying to build a body of empirical data to support their arguments and 
strengthen their positive heuristics (cf. Van de Ven, 1997).        
------------------------------------ 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
------------------------------------ 
In their attempt to strike a balance between elaborating existing research programs and the 
search for new research programs, scientific fields may be described as standing on a knife- 
edge trying to avoid getting locked into either a self-reinforcing "specialization trap" or a 
self-reinforcing "fragmentation" trap. However, there exist very complex interactions 
between activities of exploiting existing research programs and activities of searching for 
new theories/research programs that tend to undermine any kind of balance exist between 
them. Elaborating existing research programs requires the search for new theories and 
research programs in order to contribute to a scientific field’s cumulative growth of 
knowledge. At the same time each interferes with the other. Elaborating an existing research 
program tends to undermine revolutionary science by discouraging attempts of finding new 
research programs and problem solving heuristics that are essential for the long-term survival 
of a field.  Researchers in the field therefore tend to stick to one (currently progressive) 
program and its problem solving heuristic to such an extent that there is little exploration of 
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other programs, or in failing to stick to one (underdeveloped and currently degenerating) 
program long enough to determine its "true" problem solving capacity. 
 
 In a similar fashion, revolutionary science undermines normal science. Efforts to promote 
revolutionary science encourage impatience with new research programs and problem 
solving heuristics.  New research programs are therefore likely to be abandoned before 
enough time has been devoted to developing the strength of their heuristic, thereby making 
them progressive. The impatience of revolutionary science results in unelaborated 
discoveries and a fragmented knowledge structure.  As a result of the ways in which normal 
science and revolutionary science tend to extinguish each other, most scientific fields will be 
struggling to maintain a healthy balance between the two. 
  
Unification, pluralism and avoiding the specialization trap and the fragmentation trap 
in organization studies. 
 
How does this "process" approach with its discussion of avoiding both the "specialization 
trap” and the "fragmentation trap” fit into the structural approach of Richard Whitley and his 
discussion of different organizational configurations in scientific fields? There seems to be a 
very simple answer to this question. The general rule is: If the field is very hierarchical in its 
research organization, which is the case for the partitioned bureaucracy (low degree of 
strategic task uncertainty and a high degree of interdependency), the field will typically be 
struggling to avoid a specialization trap. If the field, on the other hand, has a more flat 
organizational configuration such as the fragmented adhocray (high degree of task 
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uncertainty and a low degree of interdependency), the field will typically be struggling to 
avoid or get out of a fragmentation trap. Compared to these two possibilities, fields that are 
situated in between these two extremes such as the polycentric oligarchy will be closer to 
the ideal of maintaining a healthy balance between elaborating on existing research programs 
and searching for new research programs.  
 
This clarification may now help us in positioning the process approach vis-à-vis the 
unification position of Pfeffer on one hand and the pluralist position of Van Maanen on the 
other hand. From the perspective of the process model, the unification position is a less 
attractive alternative because it leads to a highly hierarchical structure and a self-reinforcing 
specialization trap that undermines the field’s adaptability to new and unforeseen 
phenomena. The pluralist position in the form of “letting thousand flowers bloom” may on 
the other hand lead to a fragmented adhocracy and get caught in a self-reinforcing 
fragmentation trap. The process model suggests alternatively that we should look for a 
healthy balance between the exploitation of already existing research programs and the 
explorations of new theories and programs, thereby avoiding both the specialization trap of 
the unification strategy and the fragmentation trap of the pluralist strategy. And the 
intellectual structure that best supports this kind of balance is the polycentric oligarchy.   
 
The conclusion that a polycentric oligarchy is the most suitable structure for promoting 
scientific progress in organization studies also find some support in the Schumpeter thesis in 
industrial organization.  According to this thesis, neither perfect competition nor monopoly 
will be the industrial organization that best promote technological progress. While perfect 
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competition (like the fragmented adhocracy) is too fragmented and monopoly (like the 
partitioned bureaucracy) is too concentrated, Schumpeter argued that oligopolistic 
competition (like the polycentric oligarchy) would best promote technological progress by 
securing an optimal trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency.  
 
To uphold the polycentric oligarchy and secure a reasonable balance between tradition and 
novelty in organization studies, the research community should try to follow a strategy of 
creative tension (cf. Poole & Van de Ven, 1989). Such a strategy direct the researchers in the 
field to exploit any opportunity offered by tensions oppositions and contradictions between 
the main research programs in order to construct new and encompassing theories or research 
programs. By not exploiting such tensions and contradictions between the existing research 
programs to construct new theories, the field risks to fall into a fragmentation trap that will 
make future progress less likely.   
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Figure 1: Reputational Organizations in the Social Sciences 
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Figure 2: The “Specialization” vs. the “Fragmentation” Trap 
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Figure 2: The “Specialization” vs. the “Fragmentation” trap. 
